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COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AND SETTLEMENT: 
EMPIRICAL INSIGHTS INTO THE ROLES ARBITRATORS PLAY     
By 
Thomas J. Stipanowich
*
 & Zachary P. Ulrich
** 
 
 
I.   INTRODUCTION 
 
It is generally understood that arbitrators adjudicate disputes and mediators help 
settle them through negotiated agreement.
1
  But what role, if any, is there for arbitrators 
in promoting settlement?  This aspect of arbitration is overlooked in some quarters,
2
 
while occasionally provoking controversy.
3
  A thoroughgoing consideration of the 
subject is long overdue.
4
     
                                                          
*
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1
 See, e.g., John W. Cooley, Arbitration vs. Mediation – Explaining the Differences, 69 JUDICATURE 263 
(1986). 
 
2
 See Paul M. Lurie, Using the guided choice process to reduce the cost of resolving construction disputes, 
9 CONSTR. L. INT’L 18, 19 (Mar. 2014) (“The legal profession generally sees arbitration as an alternative to 
a court proceeding; they do not see customized arbitration as a method to develop information which can 
affect settlement positions and break impasses”).   
 
3
 See infra text accompanying notes 99-105.  
 
4
 A step forward in terms of international dialogue on the subject is represented by a recent effort by the 
Centre for Dispute Resolution (CEDR).  See Centre for Effective Dispute Resolution, CEDR COMMISSION 
ON SETTLEMENT IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION, FINAL REPORT, 3, 11-12 (Nov. 2009) [hereinafter CEDR 
COMMISSION REPORT], available at 
http://www.cedr.com/about_us/arbitration_commission/Arbitration_Commission_Doc_Final.pdf  
(reporting results of a commission sponsored by CEDR, the London-based mediation and mediation 
training organization), discussed infra text accompanying notes 91-105.  The resulting Recommendations 
and Rules have stirred controversy. See infra text accompanying notes 99-105.  See generally Sophie 
Nappert & Dieter Flader, A Psychological Perspective on the Facilitation of Settlement in International 
Arbitration—Examining the CEDR Rules, 2 J. INT’L DISP. SETTLEMENT 459 (2011) (raising questions about 
the basic premises of the CEDR Recommendations in light of considerations regarding the psychological 
makeup and cultural background of arbitrators).    
 
 2 
 
The Rules of Ethics for International Arbitrators of the International Bar 
Association begin with a single “fundamental rule” that calls upon arbitrators to “proceed 
diligently and efficiently to provide the parties with a just and effective resolution of their 
disputes . . . . ”5  The Code of Ethics for Arbitrators in Commercial Disputes,6 the 
primary ethical framework for commercial arbitrators in the United States, admonishes 
arbitrators to “[c]onduct the [p]roceedings [f]airly and [d]iligently.”7  Arbitrators might 
reasonably interpret these standards to require them to manage the adjudicative process 
through to an award in as cost-effective and expeditious a way as is consistent with 
fundamental fairness.  But should their ethical obligations extend to helping promote an 
early resolution of a dispute by means of settlement, which is very often the best way of 
achieving cost-savings and efficiency as well as a satisfactory result?
8
  If so, just how far 
should these obligations extend, and what commensurate obligations lie with legal 
advocates and other stakeholders?      
One relevant new source of information about arbitrators’ current practices and 
perspectives, including (among many other topics) their roles in “setting the stage” for 
settlement, is an extensive recent survey of experienced arbitrators co-sponsored by the 
College of Commercial Arbitrators (“CCA”), an organization comprised of more than 
two hundred of the U.S.’ most experienced and distinguished arbitrators, and the Straus 
Institute for Dispute Resolution (“the Survey”).9  In 2013 the CCA invited the Institute to 
conduct a wide-ranging canvass of practices and perspectives of CCA members.
10
  The 
                                                          
5
 INTERNATIONAL BAR ASSOCIATION, IBA RULES OF ETHICS FOR INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATORS 1, 2 
(1987), available at http://www.ibanet.org/Publications/publications_IBA_ 
guides_and_free_materials.aspx#ethics.  The IBA Rules go on to emphasize arbitrators’ “[d]uty of 
[d]iligence,” specifying that arbitrators “should devote such time and attention as the parties may 
reasonably require having regard to all the circumstances of the case, and shall do their base to conduct the 
arbitration in such a manner that costs do not rise to an unreasonable proportion of the interests at stake.”  
Id. at 4, Section 7. 
 
6
 See THE CODE OF ETHICS FOR ARBITRATORS IN COMMERCIAL DISPUTES (EFFECTIVE MARCH 1, 2004), 
available at https://www.adr.org/aaa/ShowProperty?nodeId=/UCM/A DRSTG_003867. 
 
7
 See id., Canon IV. An Arbitrator Should Conduct the Proceedings Fairly and Diligently (emphasis added).  
 
8
 See CEDR COMMISSION REPORT, supra note  4, at 1, ¶ 1.5 (studies of attitudes of international business 
regarding dispute resolution show “parties generally want their problems solved cost effectively and 
efficiently and …this will often be best achieved through negotiated settlement).  Cf. Andrew J. Wistrich & 
Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, How Lawyer’s Intuitions Prolong Litigation, 86 SO. CAL L. REV.571, 573 (2013) 
(“[M]ost observers recognize that settlements harness the judgment of the attorneys and often a settlement 
judge or other mediator to offer the parties an acceptable resolution of their dispute without the expense 
that further litigation would entail.”).   
 
9
 College of Commercial Arbitrators-Straus Institute for Dispute Resolution Survey on Arbitration Practice 
(Fall 2013) [hereinafter “the Survey”]. 
 
10
 The Survey was conducted under the umbrella of the Straus Institute’s Theory-to-Practice Research 
Project in connection with a report on the future of arbitration which Professor Stipanowich was invited to 
present to the CCA during the fall of 2013.  The Survey consisted of 65 multiple-choice and short-answer 
questions on respondents’ arbitration experiences and opinions on arbitration practices and the future of the 
arbitration field-at-large.  The Survey asked questions pertaining both “domestic” (defined in the Survey as 
“in the U.S. between U.S. parties”) and “international” (all other) arbitrations.  The Survey was sent 
electronically to 225 individuals, all CCA Fellows, of whom 134 individuals (59.6% of the subject pool) 
 3 
 
Survey results depict a professional cadre of arbitrators with broad and varied 
professional backgrounds as lawyers and judges,
11
 most of whom arbitrate international 
cases as well as disputes between U.S. parties.
12
 As reflected in Chart A, roughly two-
thirds of respondents indicated they spend at least half of their working hours arbitrating 
cases.
13
     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                             
completed the survey instrument.  The Survey and associated data are available from Professor 
Stipanowich upon request. 
Subjects were given the option of whether or not to indicate their gender or age.  At the time the 
Survey was administered, the average age of those respondents indicating their age (110 individuals) was 
around 65 years of age.  Eighty-five percent (85.0%) of survey participants indicating their gender (123 
individuals) represented that they were male. 
 
11
 Among respondents, 81.9% reported having “litigation” backgrounds, 28.4% reported having 
“transactional-attorney” backgrounds and 9.5% reported having” judicial” backgrounds (these categories 
were not mutually exclusive).  The participant pool had a mean arbitration-career length of more than 20 
years (calculated as a weighted average of responses to a multiple-choice question asking respondents to 
choose among several ranges indicating the length of time that has passed since they first arbitrated a case, 
and using the lowest-possible value for each range) and 78.7% of respondents reported having practiced as 
arbitrators for at least 20 years.  Further, respondents indicated a mean of at least 170 arbitrations each 
(calculated using the same weighted-average methodology as described above), and over two-thirds of 
participants (67.7%) reported having served as an arbitrator over 100 times throughout their career.   
 
12
 The great majority (84.4%) of respondents indicated they had previously arbitrated an international 
dispute.  Of those who had done so, almost half (47.7%) had averaged at least one international case per 
year for the last five years, and almost one-third (32.7%) averaged at least two international cases per year.  
 
13
 Nearly three-fourths (74.0%) of respondents indicated that they still worked “full time,” and of those who 
did not work full time over ninety percent (90.9%) worked “at least occasionally.”  Given the level of the 
subjects’ ongoing professional activities, it is of note that nearly two-thirds (65.8%) of participants  
indicated they spend half or more of their work time as arbitrators, while almost twenty percent (19.8%) of 
respondents indicated that “over 90%” of their work time is spent as an arbitrator.  
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Chart A. Percentage of Working Hours as an Arbitrator 
Q: What percent of your work time is currently devoted to practice as an arbitrator? 
 
 
 
Among other things, the resulting data highlight variations in current arbitrator 
beliefs and behavior and provide a foundation for more intensive discussion and debate 
about how and why arbitrators do what they do.
14
  At a time when the trend toward 
professionalization captured in this Survey parallels the continuing global expansion and 
evolution of arbitration practice,
15
 insights from empirical initiatives of this kind may 
serve as a critical element in what some have envisioned as an “informed convergence” 
or harmonization of perspectives and practices in arbitration.
16
  
                                                          
14
 An overview and general analysis of the Survey data is forthcoming in Thomas J. Stipanowich & 
Zachary P. Ulrich, Arbitration in Evolution: Current Practices and Perspectives of Experienced 
Commercial Arbitrators (draft available from authors).      
 
15
 See Yves Dezalay & Bryant G. Garth, DEALING IN VIRTUE: INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 
AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF A TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER 37 (The University of Chicago Press 1996) 
(quoting pre-eminent arbitrator and arbitration practitioner Jan Paulsson, stating “the age of innocence has 
come to an end . . . [and] the delightful discipline of a handful of academic aficionados . . . has become a 
matter of serious concern for great numbers of professionals determined to master a process because it is 
essential to their business.”); see also Catherine A. Rogers, The Vocation of International Arbitrators, 20 
AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 957, 992-99 (2005) (arguing that the field of international arbitration is a profession 
because, among other reasons, by nature the field provides many of the same services often ascribed to 
lawyers and judges). 
 
16
 Shahla F. Ali, The Morality of Conciliation: An Empirical Examination of Arbitrator “Role Moralities” 
in East Asia and the West, 16 HARV. NEG. L. REV. 1, 4 (2011).  We recognize that there is a “possible gap 
between what professional actors believe they are doing in a given institutional context and what they are 
actually doing.”  See Nappert & Flader, supra note 4, at 464.  We are confident, however, that much of the 
data from this Survey will measurably advance our discussion of a number of topics confronting 
commercial arbitration.    
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As professional providers of private justice, arbitrators must heed Aristotle’s 
admonition to exercise their virtue for another’s good and not for themselves.17  In the 
present environment, this involves doing something more than simply operating in 
accordance with one’s own intuitive lights.  Given the intensity of present discourse 
within the web of arbitration networks regarding virtually every aspect of arbitration 
practice and procedure, present-day arbitrators should be increasingly mindful of the 
legal and ethical obligations they shoulder in the course of their practice, and be 
reflective and deliberate about what they do and how they do it. Through listservs
18
 and 
blogs,
19
 growing thousands converse online, en masse, on a daily basis, sharing 
perspectives on diverse issues of arbitration law and practice from legal doctrine to 
psychological insights regarding negotiation and decision-making.  Such networks herald 
a new era of unprecedented discussion, debate and re-examination regarding current 
practices, encouraging persistent and rigorous questioning about the often-difficult 
practical realities that repose in the belly of our time-honored norms.   
The role of arbitrators in promoting the informal settlement of disputes before 
them is a subject that is ripe for deliberation and debate.  The topic is intertwined with 
concerns regarding efficiency and economy in arbitration, which in recent years has been 
the subject of continuing attention and discussion.
20
  A recent poll of international 
corporate counsel focusing on the financial services, energy and construction industries 
revealed that cost and delay are frequently concerns of parties to international 
arbitration.
21
  A 2011 survey of Fortune 1,000 corporate counsel indicated that although 
saving money and saving time are the two leading reasons for major companies to choose 
                                                          
17
 “[J]ustice, alone of the virtues, is thought to be 'another's good', because it is related to our neighbor[.]     
. . . [T]he best man is not he who exercises his virtue towards himself but he who exercises it towards 
another; for this is a difficult task.”  ARISTOTLE, THE NICOMACHEAN ETHICS, 2010 Pepperdine.elib.com, 
*108-09. 
 
18
 See, e.g., Oil-Gas-Energy-Mining-Infrastructure Dispute Management Listserv, ogemid@ogeltdm.com; 
Mediation and Arbitration Forum listserv, mediate-and-arbitrate@peach.ease.lsoft.com. 
 
19
 See, e.g., Kluwer Arbitration Blog, http://kluwerarbitrationblog.com (last accessed May 22, 2014); 
Arbitration Nation, http://arbitrationnation.com (last accessed May 22, 2014). 
 
20
 See Michael McIlwrath & Roland Schroeder, Transparency in International Arbitration: What Are 
Arbitrators and Institutions Afraid Of?, CONTEMPORARY ISSUES IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION AND 
MEDIATION: THE FORDHAM PAPERS 2010 (Arthur Rovine, ed.) 333 (2011); Richard Chernick & Robert B. 
Davidson, The Search for Cost Effective and Efficient International Commercial Arbitration: There is a 
Solution, THE INTERNATIONAL COMPARATIVE LEGAL GUIDE TO: INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 2011: A 
PRACTICAL CROSS-BORDER INSIGHT INTO INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION WORK 8 (2011).  See also Thomas J. 
Stipanowich, Arbitration: The “New Litigation,” 2010 ILL. L. REV. 1, 5 (2010).  
 
21
 Queen Mary University of London & PriceWaterhouseCoopers, 2013 International Arbitration Survey: 
Corporate Choices in International Arbitration, Industry Perspectives 2013, at 6, 8, 21, 22 
http://www.pwc.com/arbitrationstudy/.  The report states that these concerns are consistently cited by users 
of arbitral processes, although they may not factor highly into parties’ actual decision-making when they 
decide whether or not to initiate arbitration proceedings.  The report also notes the “intense debate 
surrounding cost and delay” having raised concerns among some of the largest corporate users of 
international arbitration, and states that more than 40% of respondents were influenced by the “overall cost 
of service” in selecting an arbitral institution once having already decided to arbitrate.     
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some form of alternative dispute resolution over litigation,
22
 unease about arbitration-
related costs is actually perceived as a barrier to the use of commercial arbitration by a 
growing number of companies.
23
  
Concerns about mounting costs and dispute resolution cycle time have inspired 
important initiatives aimed at availing users of choices that facilitate more cost-effective 
and expeditious arbitration.
24
  While these efforts tend to focus on hastening the 
rendering of judgment, they also encompass approaches that may set the stage for and 
encourage negotiation and other informal avenues of settlement.
25
  As noted above, early 
settlement of a dispute can be a uniquely effective way of minimizing cost and cycle time 
in dispute resolution.
26
  But the role of arbitrators in setting the stage for or facilitating 
settlement has not been given significant attention, at least in places like the U.S.
27
   
Responses to the CCA-Straus Institute Survey indicate that, as was the experience 
in recent decades with litigated cases,
28
 settlement during the course of arbitration 
procedures, and prior to award, is becoming increasingly prevalent.
29
  Curiously, 
however, many experienced arbitrators apparently do not perceive their arbitral role as 
extending to the promotion of settlement.
30
  The roots of such perceptions are unclear, but 
may in some cases reflect an all-consuming focus on the arbitrator’s adjudicative 
function.
31
  This focus may be reinforced by the sense of discomfort some may feel about 
shifting to a facilitative role, either because it requires different skills and a different 
mindset,
32
 or because it is viewed as incompatible or even detrimental to the arbitral 
                                                          
22
 Thomas J. Stipanowich & Ryan J. Lamare, Living with ADR: Evolving Perceptions and Use of 
Mediation, Arbitration and Conflict Management in Fortune 1,000 Corporations, 19 HARV. NEGOT. L. 
REV. 1, 37, tbl. D  (2014), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2221471. 
 
23
 See id. at 53, tbl. P (22.9% of companies see costs as a barrier to the use of arbitration in corporate 
/commercial disputes in 2011, as compared to 14.8% who saw costs as a barrier to the use of arbitration 
generally in 1997).   
 
24
 See Thomas J. Stipanowich, Part II. Soft Law in the Organization and General Conduct of Commercial 
Arbitration Proceedings (2014) in SOFT LAW IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION (Lawrence W. Newman & 
Michael Radine, ed. 2014) available at http://ssrn.com/abstract= 2407187; see also, e.g., Robert H. Smit & 
Tyler B. Robinson, Cost Awards in International Commercial Arbitration: Proposed Guidelines for 
Promoting Time and Cost Efficiency, 20 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 267, 267-68, 279-84 (2009) (advocating for 
revised guidelines on allocating arbitration costs in arbitration agreements). 
 
25
 See infra notes 72-89 and accompanying text. 
 
26
 See infra text accompanying note 48.   
 
27
 See CEDR COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 4, at 1, ¶ 1.3 (noting that “it is only in certain jurisdictions 
that tribunals are active in [encouraging settlement]”).   
 
28
 See infra notes 106-109 and accompanying text. 
 
29
 See infra Part III.A.   
 
30
 See infra Part III.B.  
 
31
 See infra text accompanying note 113. 
 
32
 See infra text accompanying note 115. 
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role.
33
  (As we will see, however, it is possible for arbitrators to play a role in settlement 
without actively facilitating or mediating.)  For some, a perhaps-unconscious motivation 
to ignore opportunities to promote settlement may lie in the desire to maintain sufficient 
hours of commercial arbitration work in an increasingly competitive environment.
34
        
On the other hand, many experienced arbitrators are conducting themselves as 
proactive managers of the case before them,
35
 and many perceive a connection between 
their activities and settlement.
36
  One of the most effective means by which arbitrators 
“set the stage” for settlement is by ruling upon dispositive motions, another focus of 
Survey questions.
37
  A sizable minority of Survey respondents have gone so far as to take 
more direct action in facilitating settlement, sometimes by embracing dual roles in 
resolving a dispute (that is, by serving as both a mediator and an arbitrator).
38
  In Part II 
we will briefly consider the function of settlement in the quest for economy and 
efficiency in dispute resolution and the various approaches aimed directly at promotion of 
settlement, such as stepped dispute resolution, creative variants, and “med-arb.”39  We 
will then discuss ways in which techniques featured in recent initiatives promoting more 
cost-effective and expeditious arbitration may also lay the groundwork for settlement,
40
 
as well as the more contentious ground traversed by the CEDR Commission on 
Settlement in International Arbitration.
41
  Part III will compare Survey results showing a 
recent increase in the incidence of pre-hearing and pre-award settlement in arbitration,
42
 
as well as Survey responses reflecting experienced arbitrators’ differing perspectives 
toward their role respecting informal settlement during arbitration.
43
  Part IV will explore 
the activities of arbitrators who do engage in activities which they regard as setting the 
stage for settlement
44
 and focus particularly on approaches to the handling of dispositive 
motions in arbitration
45
 as well as the more controversial approach involving a single 
                                                          
33
 See infra text accompanying notes 116-17. 
 
34
 See infra text accompanying notes 118-19.  
 
35
 See infra Parts IV.A., B.      
 
36
 See infra Table E, p. 21.   
 
37
 See infra Part IV.B. 
 
38
 See infra Part IV.C.   
 
39
 See infra Part II.A. 
 
40
 See infra Part II.B. 
 
41
 See infra Part II.C. 
 
42
 See infra Part III.A. 
 
43
 See infra Part III.B. 
 
44
 See infra Part IV.A. 
 
45
 See infra Part IV.B.   
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individual serving the dual roles of mediator and arbitrator.
46
  In Part V, we conclude by 
offering some straightforward proposals to stimulate appropriate involvement by 
arbitrators as well as attorneys and other “stakeholders” in setting the stage for 
settlement.     
 
II.    TECHNIQUES FOR PROMOTING SETTLEMENT IN DISPUTE RESOLUTION  
Respondents to a 2011 survey of corporate counsel in Fortune 1,000 corporations 
identified each of the following goals as among the reasons companies choose ADR 
(alternative or appropriate dispute resolution) over litigation: saving time (70.9% of 
respondents); saving money (68.7%); allowing parties to resolve disputes themselves 
(52.4%); limiting discovery (51.5%); preserving privacy and confidentiality (46.8%); and 
preserving good relationships (43.5%).
47
  Each of these goals is likely to be effectively 
served—indeed, perhaps best served—by a negotiated settlement of disputes occurring as 
early as possible after a dispute arises.
48
   
In recognition of the potential benefits of early settlement many parties to 
commercial contracts include stepped dispute resolution provisions that call for early 
negotiation and mediation prior to binding arbitration or litigation; some have sought to 
overcome the limitations of these “linear” approaches by creative variations, including 
casting neutrals in dual roles.  In addition, recent initiatives aimed at promoting 
efficiency and economy in arbitration proceedings have created additional opportunities 
for early resolution or settlement, while the CEDR Commission took a more direct—and 
controversial—step by casting arbitrators in a more formal role as settlement facilitators.                   
A. Promotion of Settlement in Dispute Resolution through Stepped Systems 
Stepped dispute resolution provisions in commercial contracts are a 
straightforward response to the reality that most business disputes are amenable to a 
negotiated resolution, and that there are multiple benefits associated with early, informal 
resolution of disputes.
49
  Stepped approaches are intended to function as a series of sieves 
or filters to cull out all of the issues and controversies that may be resolved short of 
binding adjudication. Where direct negotiation between representatives of the parties is 
unavailing, the intervention of a mediator may help break the logjam and craft a workable 
resolution.
50
   
                                                          
46
 See infra Part IV.C.  
 
47
 Stipanowich & Lamare, supra note 22, at 37, tbl. D.   
 
48
 See COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AT ITS BEST: SUCCESSFUL STRATEGIES FOR BUSINESS USERS (Thomas J. 
Stipanowich & Peter H. Kaskell, eds. 2001) [hereinafter COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AT ITS BEST] at 5-6 
(discussing priorities for business conflict management).  See also Wistrich & Rachlinski, supra note 8, at 
575 (“Although faster is not always better when it comes to settlements, it is usually better”).  
 
49
 See id., Chapter 1 (discussing role importance of multi-tiered approaches for management of conflict and 
avoiding stand-alone arbitration provisions).   See also CEDR COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 4, at 4, 
¶4.2.1 (discussing benefits of multi-tier dispute resolution clauses). 
 
50
 See id. at 11-14. 
 9 
 
But the linear arrangement of elements in multi-stage dispute resolution templates 
does not take account of the reality that dispute resolution is very often “non-linear.”  It is 
frequently not viewed as possible or practicable to settle a case before the filing of an 
arbitration demand.  This may be because of differing (and often, unrealistic) 
expectations on the part of counsel or parties regarding the likely disposition of issues 
should the case go to trial or arbitration or the settlement value of a case,
51
 the perceived 
need for more information,
52
 or other factors.  Recent  empirical research indicates that 
legal advocates’ judgments and choices regarding settlement may be clouded by, and 
settlement delayed by, lawyers’ excessive reliance on intuition, the desire to avoid 
perceived loss; the tendency to seek confirmation of the biases they bring to litigation; the 
notion that it is always better to have more information; and concerns about justifying 
previously spent dollars in litigating a case.
53
  When settlement does not occur during the 
preliminary stages of dispute resolution, the arbitration proceeding becomes the backdrop 
against which negotiated settlement discussions will occur.  In many such cases, 
mediation is postponed until a relatively late stage in the pre-hearing process when 
discovery is completed or well-advanced.
54
  
Over the years, there have been efforts to “think outside the box” of the linear 
framework of stepped dispute resolution by exploiting its potentialities in different ways.  
For example, it has been suggested that mediators be equipped with a wider variety of 
tools (such as a more nuanced appreciation of cognitive factors affecting negotiations) to 
break impasse at early stages of conflict.
55
  They may also facilitate the parties’ focus on 
key factual issues and related, limited information exchange
56
 or targeted binding or 
nonbinding decisions by judges or arbitrators that could lay the groundwork for 
resolution of conflict
57
--subjects we will re-visit below.  Even where substantive issues 
cannot be resolved in mediation, mediators may nevertheless focus on facilitating 
agreements regarding dispute resolution process elements and helping parties to set the 
stage for arbitration proceedings with features that are effectively tailored to the issues at 
hand.
58
     
                                                          
51
 Wistrich & Rachlinski, supra note 8, at 576; Lurie, supra note 2, at 21.   
 
52
 Id.; Lurie at20. 
 
53
  See generally id.  See also RANDALL KISER, BEYOND RIGHT AND WRONG: THE POWER OF EFFECTIVE 
DECISION MAKING FOR ATTORNEYS AND CLIENTS 89-195 (2010) (discussing “decision errors” by attorneys 
and related psychological and institutional factors). 
 
54
 Id. at 19 (noting that “mediation is frequently seen as a tool to be used close to trial or an arbitration 
hearing as a hedge against an unfavourable judgment or award”).   
 
55
 Id. at 19-20.   
 
56
 COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AT ITS BEST, supra note 48, at 19.  
 
57
 Lurie, supra note 2, at 20-21. Cf. Wistrich & Rachlinski, supra note 8, at 624-626. 
 
58
 Id. at 19-20.  Paul Lurie’s Guided Choice concept actually centers on the notion of using mediation to 
“diagnose” a dispute and assist parties in structuring an appropriate dispute resolution process, possibly 
including an appropriately tailored form of arbitration. Other thoughtful suggestions for promoting earlier 
settlement or more appropriate dispute resolution may be found in Alana S. Knaster, “Scientific 
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Finally, some have promoted or participated in forms of “med-arb,” by which we 
mean a proceeding in which a single third party serves, or agrees to serve, as the mediator 
and arbitrator.
59
   Sometimes, arrangements are made between disputing parties and a 
third party “neutral” prior to the commencement of any services that the latter will 
mediate the dispute and, failing a complete resolution of the dispute, will arbitrate all 
outstanding matters.
60
  A variant of this kind of arrangement is “MEDALOA”—
mediation followed by last-offer (or final offer) arbitration.
61
  Sometimes, third parties 
who are engaged in mediating a dispute are asked to shift to an arbitral role and 
adjudicate the dispute;
62
 in other cases arbitrators are invited to assume the role of 
mediators.
63
  These kinds of dual-role arrangements raise a variety of legal, practical, and 
ethical issues that have led many practitioners and neutrals to avoid them,
64
 although they 
tend to be more readily embraced in some other parts of the world.
65
  There are 
indications, however, that many U.S. neutrals do engage in such activities, albeit 
relatively infrequently.
66
              
 
B. “Setting the Stage” for Settlement during Arbitration 
Leading arbitration rules often include no specific reference to settlement other 
than to make provision for terminating proceedings and recording the settlement in the 
form of an arbitration award if the parties so agree.
67
  Rules such as those published by 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Negotiations: ADR’s answer to the battle of expert witnesses, THE RECORDER 1 (Fall 1994); John A. 
Sherrill, Cooperative Negotiation, Mediation and Arbitration: Creating a Sequential and More Efficient 
Dispute Resolution Process (paper on file with Prof. Stipanowich).     
 
59
 See COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AT ITS BEST, supra note 48, at 20-24. 
 
60
 See id. 
 
61
 See id. at 25-26. 
 
62
 See id. at 22-24 (setting forth suggested guidelines for handling such arrangements) . 
 
63
 See id. at 29-30 (setting forth suggested guidelines for handling such arrangements).  
 
64
 See infra text accompanying notes130-134.  See also id. at 20-22 (discussing attitudes of leading 
arbitrators and practitioners on CPR Commission and concerns regarding med-arb); Thomas Stipanowich, 
Contract and Conflict Management, 2001 WIS. L. REV. 831, 853-55 (2001), available at http://ssrn.com/ 
abstract=1377917.  See also CEDR COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 4, at 3 ¶ 2.5.    
 
65
 For an excellent tabular summary of different national laws and their posture regarding arbitrators’ 
promotion of and involvement in settlement efforts and related issues, see CEDR COMMISSION REPORT, 
supra note 4, at Appendix 4, 18ff.  See also Reflections on Med-Arb and Arb-Med: Around the world, 2 
N.Y.DISP. RESOL. L. 71-119 (Spring 2009) (collection of articles highlighting use of med-arb and variants). 
 
66
 See Stipanowich, supra note 64, at 853-54.  See also infra Part IV.C.     
 
67
 See, e.g., AAA INTERNATIONAL CENTRE FOR DISPUTE RESOLUTION, INTERNATIONAL DISPUTE 
RESOLUTION PROCEDURES Article 29(1) (Rules Amended and Effective June 1, 2009) (including provision 
for termination of arbitration proceedings and for recording settlement as consent award if so agreed); 
UNITED NATIONS COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW, UNCITRAL ARBITRATION RULES Article 
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the International Institute for Conflict Prevention & Resolution (CPR) are exceptional in 
providing more specific guidance for parties and arbitrators.
68
  The CPR Rules permit 
arbitrators to “suggest that the parties explore settlement at such times as the Tribunal 
may deem appropriate”69 and, with the consent of the parties, even arrange for mediation 
of claims.
70
  Reflecting concerns regarding the need for separation of mediative and 
arbitral functions, the CPR Rules direct that the mediator shall not be a member of the 
arbitration Tribunal, and the Tribunal shall not be apprised of offers or statements made 
during negotiations or mediation absent both parties’ consent.71       
However, recent guidelines developed by organizations such as the International 
Chamber of Commerce (ICC) and the College of Commercial Arbitrators (CCA) aimed 
at promoting more cost-effective and efficient arbitration have also enhanced the 
opportunities for early settlement, including approaches that permit arbitrators to help 
“set the stage” for early resolution or negotiated settlement.  In 2007, the ICC 
Commission on Arbitration and ADR set up a Task Force on Reducing Time and Costs in 
Arbitration that produced a report entitled Techniques for Controlling Time and Costs in 
                                                                                                                                                                             
36(1) (as revised in 2010) (same);  ICC RULES OF ARBITRATION  32 (1 Jan. 2012) (provision for recording 
of agreement as consent award).  
   
68
 The CPR Rules for Non-Administered Arbitration of Business Disputes provide:  
Rule 19: Settlement and Mediation 
19.1  Either party may propose settlement negotiations to the other party at 
any time. The Tribunal may suggest that the parties explore settlement 
at such times as the Tribunal may deem appropriate. 
19.2  With the consent of the parties, the Tribunal at any stage of the 
proceeding may arrange for mediation of the claims asserted in the 
arbitration by a mediator acceptable to the parties. The mediator shall 
be a person other than a member of the Tribunal. Unless the parties 
agree otherwise, any such mediation shall be conducted under the CPR 
Mediation Procedure. 
19.3  The Tribunal will not be informed of any settlement offers or other 
statements made during settlement negotiations or a mediation between 
the parties, unless both parties consent. 
19.4  If the parties settle the dispute before an award is made, the Tribunal 
shall terminate the arbitration and, if requested by all parties and 
accepted by the Tribunal, may record the settlement in the form of an 
award made by consent of the parties. The Tribunal is not obliged to 
give reasons for such an award.   
INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR CONFLICT PREVENTION & RESOLUTION, CPR RULES FOR NON-
ADMINISTERED ARBITRATION OF BUSINESS DISPUTES Art. 19 (Effective Nov. 1, 2007).   For a summary of 
the provisions of various national arbitration laws on arbitrator involvement in settlement, see CEDR 
COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 4, Appendix 4 (summarizing pertinent elements of various national laws).   
 
69
 Id., Art. 19.1. 
 
70
 Id., Art. 19.2. 
 
71
 Id., Art. 19.2, 19.3. 
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Arbitration.
72
  In 2009, the CCA, convened leading dispute resolution organizations and 
stakeholders in a National Summit on Business-to-Business Arbitration to identify the 
chief causes of excessive cost and delay in arbitration and to explore “concrete practical 
steps” to remedy them.73  This led to the publication of the CCA Protocols for 
Expeditious, Cost-Effective Commercial Arbitration,
74
 comprised of proposed action 
steps for business users and in-house counsel, outside counsel, arbitrators and arbitration 
provider institutions.
75
  The ICC Techniques and the CCA Protocols appear to have 
resonated with many arbitrators and users of arbitration and to have influenced evolving 
practices,
76
 some of which may also create or enhance the opportunity for a negotiated 
settlement of all or part of the dispute.  For example, the CCA Protocols enhance 
opportunities for early resolution or settlement by encouraging the following:  
 contractual provisions for negotiation and mediation prior to arbitration;77 
 creative use of the skills of a mediator in laying the groundwork for arbitration, 
including facilitating agreements regarding information exchange; clarifying 
issues that have been resolved in mediation and framing issues to be arbitrated; 
and “encourag[ing] parties to jointly submit the one or two most significant 
questions of law or fact to the arbitrator for speedy resolution, and then return to 
mediation;”78 
                                                          
72
 ICC COMMISSION ON ARBITRATION AND ADR, TECHNIQUES FOR CONTROLLING TIME AND COSTS IN 
ARBITRATION (August 2007).   
 
73
 THE COLLEGE OF COMMERCIAL ARBITRATORS PROTOCOLS ON EXPEDITIOUS, COST-EFFECTIVE 
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION: KEY ACTION STEPS FOR BUSINESS USERS, COUNSEL, ARBITRATORS AND 
ARBITRATION PROVIDER INSTITUTIONS (Thomas J. Stipanowich et al, ed. 2010) [hereinafter CCA 
Protocols] at 4-21.  Other important set of guidelines with similar aims was developed under the auspices 
of the New York State Bar Association.  NEW YORK STATE BAR ASSOCIATION DISPUTE RESOLUTION 
SECTION, GUIDELINES FOR THE ARBITRATOR’S CONDUCT OF THE PRE-HEARING PHAS OF DOMESTIC 
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATIONS AND GUIDELINES FOR THE ARBITRATOR’S CONDUCT OF THE PRE-HEARING 
PHASE OF INTERNATIONA ARBITRATIONS (2010-11).  See also NEW YORK STATE BAR ASSOCIATION 
DISPUTE RESOLUTION SECTION ARBITRATION COMMITTEE, REPORT ON ARBITRATION DISCOVERY IN 
DOMESTIC COMMERCIAL CASES (June 2009), available at 
http://www.nysba.org/Content/NavigationMenu42/April42009HouseofDelegatesMeetingAgendaItems/isco
veryPreceptsReport.pdf.  
 
74
 See generally id. 
 
75
 Although aimed primarily at U.S. domestic arbitration, the CCA Protocols offer guidance that is 
applicable to international arbitration.  See, e.g., Doug Jones, Techniques in managing the process of 
arbitration, 78(2) ARBITRATION 140. 144-45 (2012) (observing that guidelines in CCA Protocols respecting 
limitations on discovery “are applicable to limiting document disclosure in international arbitration”).  See 
also Michael McIlwrath, Faster, cheaper: global initiatives to promote efficiency in international 
arbitration, 76(3) ARBITRATION 532 (2010). 
 
76
 See Stipanowich, supra note 24, at 79-88 (discussing these standards and their impact).    
 
77
 CCA PROTOCOLS, supra note 73, at 25, 44. 
 
78
 Id. at 44-45.  Cf. Wistrich & Rachlinski, supra note 8, at 624-625 (suggesting parties tighten discovery 
limits as a means of focusing dispute resolution).   
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 resort to mediation during the course of the arbitration proceeding;79 
 continuing active involvement during the dispute resolution process by business 
clients and in-house counsel,
80
 permitting continuous monitoring of the course of 
dispute resolution and periodic consideration and cost-benefit analysis of 
settlement opportunities;
81
   
 “teeing up” of particular issues for early resolution when it is likely to promote 
fruitful settlement discussions;
82
 
 “aggressive” action on motions for summary disposition that “hold reasonable 
promise for streamlining or focusing the arbitration process:”83 
 adherence to established deadlines;84 where appropriate, the use of streamlined 
procedures;
85
 early “fleshing out” of the case;86 and more targeted discovery;87 all 
of which may stimulate earlier settlement.  
The complete CCA-Straus Institute Survey results, soon to be published, reflect a 
wide array of approaches experienced arbitrators are employing to actively and 
efficiently manage cases through the pre-hearing and hearing stages.
88
  These activities, 
undoubtedly influenced by initiatives like the CCA Protocols and related efforts,
89
 can 
play a key role in settlement; this is exemplified by arbitrator management of dispositive 
motions, discussed below.
90
     
 
                                                          
79
 Id. at 65 (“If a professionally conducted mediation did not precede the arbitration (and sometimes even if 
it did), counsel should raise with the client the possibility of a thorough mediation with a neutral not 
involved in the arbitration.”).   
 
80
 Id. at 29-30 (role of business client, corporate counsel).   
 
81
 Id. at 64-65 (role of outside counsel). 
 
82
 Id. at 56; (role of provider institutions); 69 (role of arbitrators).  Cf. Wistrich & Rachlinski, supra note 8, 
at 626 (discussing active judicial case management, encouraging parties to pursue “diagnostic or important 
discovery first”). 
 
83
 Id. at 36 (role of business users and counsel) ; 73-74 (role of arbitrators). 
 
84
 Id. at 26-28 (role of business users and counsel); 55 (role of arbitration provider institutions); 69-70 (role 
of arbitrators). 
 
85
 Id. at 29 (role of business users and counsel); 55-56 (role of provider institutions). 
 
86
 Id. at 34-35 (role of business users and counsel); 57 (role of provider institutions); 70-71 (role of 
arbitrators).   
 
87
 Id. at 26 (role of business users and counsel); 45-55 (role of provider institutions); 64 (role of outside 
counsel); 72 (role of arbitrators). 
 
88
 See Stipanowich & Ulrich, supra note 14.     
 
89
 See Stipanowich, supra note 24, at 76-77 (discussing impact of ICC Techniques and CCA Protocols) 
 
90
 See infra text accompanying notes 122-129.   
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C. Arbitrators Directly Facilitating Settlement: The CEDR Commission 
 
The work of the CEDR Commission on Settlement in International Arbitration
91
 
represents the first major international effort to focus specifically on settlement during 
arbitration.  Its stated intent is establish a broad-based international consensus on the role 
of international arbitrators in facilitating settlement,
92
 but although the effort is in many 
respects commendable it envisions roles for arbitrators in the active facilitation of 
settlement that fall well short of a consensus model and are in some respects 
controversial.
93
     
To some extent, the CEDR Recommendations and CEDR Rules for Facilitation of 
Settlement in International Arbitration cover ground also touched upon by other recent 
guidelines, including the notion of conducting arbitration proceedings “in conjunction 
with other processes to achieve efficient and cost-effective outcomes,”94 the value of 
multi-tier dispute resolution clauses
95
 and the use of a “mediation window” during 
arbitration.
96
     
Central elements of the Rules, however, are drawn from German, Swiss and 
Chinese practices
97
 that are not universally embraced.  The Rules state that in the absence 
of a contrary written agreement arbitrators may take any of the following measures for 
the purpose of facilitating settlement:  
 
1.1. provide all [p]arties with the [a]rbitral [t]ribunal’s 
preliminary views on the issues in dispute in the arbitration 
and what the [a]rbitral [t]ribunal considers will be necessary 
in terms of evidence from each [p]arty in order to prevail on 
those issues;  
                                                          
91
 See id. at 3, 11-12.     
 
92
 Id. at 2.  See Gabrielle Kaufmann-Kohler, When Arbitrators Facilitate Settlement: Towards a 
Transnational Standard, 25 J. LONDON COURT INT’L ARB. 2 (2009) (article by CEDR commission chair 
discussing growth of international consensus regarding arbitrators as settlement facilitators, and examining 
the potential of a uniform standard by which arbitrators can effectively fulfill that role).  Ms. Kaufmann-
Kohler observes, “[A] transnational standard may well emerge on this issue as it has for many other topics 
of arbitration law in the recent past.”   
 
93
 See generally Nappert & Flader, supra note 4.  See infra text accompanying notes 99-105; see also infra 
text accompanying notes 130-134 (discussing concerns regarding mixing of the roles of mediator and 
arbitrator). 
 
94
 Id. at 3, ¶2.7.1. 
 
95
 Id. at 4,¶4.2.1. 
 
96
 The Rules require arbitrators to “insert a [m]ediation [w]indow in the arbitral proceedings when 
requested to do so by all [p]arties in order to enable settlement discussions,” and, moreover, to “adjourn the 
arbitral proceedings for a specified period so as to enable mediation to take place” in certain circumstances.  
Id. at 5, 12. 
 
97
 Id. at 2, ¶2.2. 
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1.2. provide all [p]arties with preliminary non-binding findings on 
law or fact on key issues in the arbitration;  
1.3. where requested by the [p]arties in writing, offer suggested 
terms of settlement as a basis for further negotiation;  
1.4. where requested by the [p]arties in writing, chair one or more 
settlement meetings attended by representatives of the 
[p]arties at which possible terms of settlement may be 
negotiated.
98
  
 
These provisions go well the scope of other initiatives such as the ICC Techniques 
and the CCA Protocols by projecting arbitration tribunals into a much more forthright 
role as settlement masters.  Many arbitrators are likely to be uncomfortable with 
presenting preliminary views or findings, offering suggested settlement terms, or 
facilitating settlement discussions.
99
  Any or all of these approaches may be seen by some 
as undermining perceptions of arbitral impartiality,
100
 or taking arbitrators well beyond 
their adjudicative comfort zone into a realm that may require different skills and a 
different mindset.
101
  Others may be reasonably concerned about the ability of arbitrators 
to filter out communications made during settlement discussions in arriving at an 
award;
102
 or how and when an arbitration tribunal decides settlement facilitation should 
occur;
103
 how tribunals are to reach a consensus on preliminary views or findings;
104
 and 
how they are collectively to facilitate settlement between the parties.
105
     
Despite these concerns, the CEDR Rules offer a platform for beta-testing of 
procedures that thrust arbitrators into the heart of the settlement dialogue, and a tangible 
alternative for those parties and arbitrators who are comfortable with the CEDR format.  
For the time being, however, many parties and arbitrators may be reluctant to make the 
leap afforded by the CEDR Rules. 
   
                                                          
98
 Id. at 11.  The only significant limitation imposed by the CEDR Rules on arbitrators facilitating 
settlement is a prohibition on the use of caucuses and the sharing of information ex parte. 
 
99
 Nappert & Flader, supra note 4, at 461.  Cf. Peter Robinson, Opening Pandora’s Box: An Empirical 
Exploration of Judicial Settlement Ethics and Techniques, 27 OHIO. ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 53 (2012) 
(discussing range of approaches to judges to promotion of settlement). 
 
100
 Id. 
 
101
 Id. at 467-68. 
 
102
 Id. at 461.  Cf. Kristen M. Blankley, Keeping a Secret from Yourself? Confidentiality When the Same 
Neutral Serves Both as Mediator and as Arbitrator in the Same Case, 63 BAYLOR L. REV. 317 (2011). 
 
103
 Id. at 465-7. 
 
104
 Id. at 467-8. 
 
105
 Id. at 468-9. 
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III. ARBITRATOR EXPERIENCES WITH AND ATTITUDES TOWARD SETTLEMENT 
DURING ARBITRATION: RESULTS FROM THE CCA-STRAUS INSTITUTE 
SURVEY 
A. The Growing Incidence of Settlement during Arbitration 
 
A decade ago, the American Bar Association’s symposium “The Vanishing Trial” 
spotlighted a precipitous drop-off in the incidence of trial on the merits in litigation.
106
  
Among other things, this decline in trial was ascribed to the costs of full-blown 
adjudication and the risks associated with third party decision making.
107
  A litigated case 
may settle prior to trial due to the granting of a motion for summary judgment or other 
dispositive motion, a ruling on discovery, or a settlement conference, or mediation.
108
  
Settlement may even be stimulated by the mere anticipation of a pending procedural 
deadline.
109
    
Settlement also appears to be an increasingly frequent occurrence during the 
course of arbitration.  CCA-Straus Institute Survey participants were asked, “Roughly 
what percentage of cases in which you were an arbitrator settled prior to the first 
arbitration hearing?”  They were asked to report settlement percentages for two time 
periods, “[p]rior to [five] years ago” and within the “past [five] years”; the resulting data 
are summarized in Chart B.  The majority of respondents indicated that higher 
proportions of their caseloads settled pre-hearing during the last five years than prior to 
that time.  This trend is indicated both by a relative decrease in respondents reporting 
lower proportions of their caseloads as having settled (e.g., less respondents reporting 
                                                          
106
 See Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials and Related Matters in Federal and 
State Courts, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 3, 459 (2004) (reporting on a working-paper analysis conducted 
for the symposium, and showing that “the portion of federal civil cases resolved by trial fell from 11.5[%] 
in 1962 to 1.8[%] in 2002, continuing a long historic decline”); cf. Queen Mary University of London & 
PriceWaterhouseCoopers, supra note 21, at 16 (reporting that respondents indicated they were able to 
settle, on average, 57% of international disputes prior to engaging in litigation, arbitration, or other formal 
proceedings.  Of disputes that were not settled amicably, only 32% were ultimately decided in formal 
proceedings; the other 68% were not).  See generally Thomas J. Stipanowich, ADR and “The Vanishing 
Trial”: The Growth and Impact of “Alternative Dispute Resolution,” 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 3, 843 
(2004), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract= 1380922 (a meta-survey and summary of empirical studies 
examining the growth of ADR processes, resultant impact on court systems, and broader uses of and 
rationale for mediation and other ADR-process choices).  
 
107
 Id. at 477-81, 500-05, 517, 519; cf. Patricia Lee Refo, Opening Statement: The Vanishing Trial, 30 
A.B.A. LITIG. J. 2, 2-4 (Winter 2004). 
 
108
 See generally Hon. Patrick J. Walsh, Rethinking Civil Litigation in Federal District Court, 40 A.B.A. 
LITIG. J. 1, 6-8 (Fall 2013) (discussing how “less than one percent of the civil cases that could go to trial 
actually do” and arguing that such a high instance of court-case settlement means that motion practice, 
discovery management and settlement efforts should be approached by judges with the assumption that 
cases will settle, and that courts should consider introducing procedural mechanisms that facilitate and 
encourage settlement).   
 
109
 Kenneth Glasner, Contract Disputes: The Role of ADR, DISP. RESOL. J. 50 (2000); Jeremy A. Mercer & 
Evan A. Bloch, Settlement Tactics in US Litigation, PRACTICAL LAW COMPANY (2011), available at 
http://www.pepperlaw.com/publications_article.aspx?ArticleKey=2262.  
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that “31% to 40%,” or less, of their caseload settled pre-hearing) and by a relative 
increase in respondents reporting higher proportions of their caseloads having settled 
(e.g., more respondents reporting that “41% to 50%” and “[m]ore than 50%” of their 
caseloads settled pre-hearing). 
 
Chart B.  Settlement prior to Hearing 
 
Q: Roughly what percentage of cases in which you were an arbitrator  
settled prior to the first arbitration hearing? 
 
 
The Survey also asked respondents, “Roughly what percentage of cases in which 
you were an arbitrator settled at any time prior to award?”  Again, participants were 
asked to distinguish between their experiences “[p]rior to [five] years ago” and those 
within the past five years (Chart C).  The responses to this question tell much the same 
story as those displayed in Chart B, above. Experienced arbitrators indicate that, during 
the past five years, higher proportions of their caseloads settled pre-award than before 
that time.   However, while the data reflect a general upward shift in extent of pre-award 
settlement as well as the overall number of arbitrators whose cases are settling pre-award, 
the data also reflect dramatic variances in settlement rates among arbitrators. 
As might be expected, the data indicate that some disputes that did not settle prior 
to hearings are settled during hearings.  (For example, while 15.3% of respondents 
indicated “[m]ore than 50%” of their caseload settled pre-hearing in the past five years, 
22.9% of the same respondent pool indicated that proportion of their cases settled pre-
award (including those that settled after the hearing had begun).  These results underscore 
the potential impact of arbitrators’ case management at all stages of the process. 
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Chart C.  Settlement prior to Award  
 
Q: Roughly what percentage of cases in which you were an arbitrator  
settled at any time prior to award? 
 
 
 
 
If cost-effectiveness and expeditious process are often important goals to 
arbitrating parties, and if a growing number of parties are availing themselves of 
opportunities to settle their disputes prior to hearings on the merits or the rendition of an 
arbitration award, shouldn’t arbitrators be more conscious of their potential role in setting 
the stage for early settlement?  Why, given the fact an extremely high percentage of 
litigated cases are resolved prior to trial
110
 and that contract cases are particularly likely to 
settle,
111
 is the overall percentage of cases setting during arbitration not much higher?
112
  
                                                          
110
 See supra note 106 and accompanying text.   
 
111
 Several studies have been conducted to analyze correlations between case-types and settlement, albeit 
for cases adjudicated through the United States court system, but that nonetheless show tort- and contract-
related cases tend to have relatively higher settlement rates than other case types.  See Theodore Eisenberg 
& Charlotte Lanvers, What is the Settlement Rate and Why Should We Care?, 6 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 
1, 111-46 (Mar. 2009) (analyzing public records for two United States federal district courts, and showing 
that tort [an 87.2% settlement rate one federal district for the time period analyzed] and contract cases [a 
72.5% settlement rate] tend to have higher settlement rates than others examined); D. Trubek, J. Grossman, 
W. Felstiner, H. Kritzer & A. Sarat, CIVIL LITIGATION RESEARCH PROJECT: FINAL REPORT, Part A, at 1-58, 
1-72 (1983) (tbl.5) (empirical study indicating that a statistically significantly higher percentage of tort 
cases were settled pre-trial than were contract or commercial cases, and that a statistically significantly 
higher percentage of contract of commercial cases were settled than civil rights, civil liberties, or 
discrimination cases).  Since commercial arbitration is presumably dominated by contract-related disputes, 
and to a lesser extent tort claims, one would expect a relatively high percentage of arbitrated disputes to be 
resolved through settlement, as in court. 
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Why do some arbitrators report much higher rates of pre-hearing or pre-award settlement 
of their cases than others?  Do these variances reflect differences in personal philosophies 
regarding the arbitral role in settlement, arbitrators’ relative proactivity in case 
management, or some other factors such as the mix of cases they arbitrate?  With these 
questions issue in mind, we will examine other data from the CCA-Straus Institute 
Survey regarding perspectives on the roles of arbitrators in promoting settlement.   
 
B. Varying Attitudes of Arbitrators Concerning Settlement  
 
Survey participants were asked, “[h]ow often, if ever, are you concerned with 
informal settlement of the cases before you as an arbitrator?”  As reflected in Chart D, 
more than half of participants responded, “Never.”  Another third (34.4%) stated they 
concern themselves with settlement “sometimes.” And only about twelve percent (11.8%) 
of the respondents indicated they concern themselves with settlement as much as half the 
time. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                             
112
 According to the American Arbitration Association, 65% of its commercial cases (a category that 
includes cases involving business contracts and individually negotiated employment contracts) settled prior 
to award in 2013.  E-mail of Ryan Boyle, Vice President – Statistics and In-House Research, American 
Arbitration Association to Thomas J. Stipanowich (June 16, 2014) (on file with Prof. Stipanowich).  In the 
years 2010 through 2014, only 21% to 23% of FINRA arbitration cases have been resolved by arbitrator 
decision; between 59% and 65% have been resolved by direct settlement or mediation, with another 9% to 
12% withdrawn.  FINRA Dispute Resolution Statistics – How Arbitration Cases Close (May 2014), 
available at 
http://www.finra.org/ArbitrationAndMediation/FINRADisputeResolution/AdditionalResources/Statistics/. 
Cf. CEDR COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 4, at 1, ¶1.4 (reporting that “[s]ome research suggests that 
settlement rates in arbitration are significantly lower than in many national courts, particularly those courts 
where judges systematically promote early settlement and the use of ADR techniques such as mediation”).    
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Chart D. Concern with Informal Settlement 
 
Q: How often, if ever, are you concerned with informal settlement  
of the cases before you as an arbitrator? 
 
 
 
These responses are a bit surprising given the heightened incidence of settlement 
in recent years.  It is possible that at least some portion of those who answered “Never” to 
the Survey question did so because they view their roles and responsibilities strictly 
within the context of superintending complete arbitration processes that culminate in 
awards, and do not believe it necessary or appropriate to actively consider or engage in 
any way with the parties’ collateral settlement efforts.  Their view of their role in case 
management, in other words, is wholly framed in terms of the adjudicative dimension—
hearing the case and rendering an award—and ignores the possibility that the case might 
be disposed of through settlement, however likely that might be, as irrelevant to their 
function as arbitrators.
113
   
Some, too, may have read the question to imply a direct facilitative role in 
settlement along the lines of the CEDR Recommendations discussed above.
114
  It may be 
that some respondents interpreted the question to be, “How often do you regard yourself 
as personally responsible for settling the case?” or, in a more extreme vein, “How often 
do you put on the hat of a mediator to facilitate settlement of an arbitrated case?”  They 
might feel a sense of discomfort with a role they believe requires them to employ skills or 
mindsets that are very different from those of an adjudicator.
115
  More importantly, the 
                                                          
113
 Even the CEDR Commission on Settlement in International Arbitration concluded that “[a]n arbitral 
tribunal has a primary responsibility to produce an award, which is binding and enforceable,” although the 
arbitral tribunal “should also take steps to assist the parties in achieving a negotiated settlement of part or 
all of their dispute.”  CEDR COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 4, at 2, ¶¶2.4.1-2.4.2. 
 
114
 See supra text accompanying notes 97-98.   
 
115
 Nappert & Flader, supra note 4, at 461.   
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question may have stirred up the concerns of some respondents that too active a role in 
facilitating or mediating settlement “might be perceived as incompatible with the 
arbitrator’s duty of impartiality,”116 potentially undermining the arbitral function.117    
The focus on “seeing the case through to an award” may be reinforced by the 
pressures some arbitrators may feel to sustain a sufficiency of work hours in an 
increasingly competitive environment.  The stiff competition for commercial arbitration 
appointments is underlined by data from the CCA-Straus Institute Survey: almost sixty 
percent (59.5%) of College members, who count themselves among the U.S.’—and in 
some cases possibly the world’s118—most experienced and prominent commercial 
arbitrators, indicated they had less arbitration work than they would like.
119
  
For some or all of the foregoing reasons, many experienced commercial 
arbitrators are reticent about the arbitral role in settlement.  However, the Survey results 
also indicate that many arbitrators tend to recognize and actively embrace opportunities 
to promote settlement of arbitrated cases through their management of the arbitration 
process.   
 
IV. SETTING THE STAGE FOR SETTLEMENT 
A. Case Management and Settlement 
In the CCA-Straus Institute Survey, respondents who indicated some level of concern 
regarding settlement were asked to indicate how and to what extent their own activities 
                                                          
116
 Id.   
 
117
 Id.  Shahla Ali reported the results of an empirical study showing that, even though just over seventy 
percent of arbitrators from East Asia, North America and Europe see it as appropriate to suggest settlement 
negotiations to parties, most arbitrators from all regions rarely actually do so (although, arbitrators in East 
Asia tend to suggest settlement negotiations slightly more often than do arbitrators from North America or 
Europe).  Interestingly, the percentage of arbitrators who concerned themselves with informal settlement at 
least some of the time was slightly higher among those who had never mediated a case (54.2%) than those 
who had mediated.  See Ali, supra note 16, at 8, 25.   On the other hand, when the arbitrators were asked, 
“[i]s it appropriate for the arbitrator to meet with parties separately to discuss settlement options (with both 
parties’ request)?” 38% of respondents from North America and Europe answered “[y]es,” as did 43% of 
respondents from East Asia.  There was no statistically significant difference found between either 
geographically-defined group’s responses to this question.  While not addressing the role of the arbitrator 
as “mediator” per se, the question does directly ask for respondents’ perceptions regarding the 
appropriateness of an arbitrator conducting informal settlement discussions in a manner arguably the same 
as a mediation caucus.  Id. at 18.  
 
118
 See supra note 12 (describing international experience of Survey respondents). 
 
119
 Based on the Survey data, there does not appear to be a substantial difference between the arbitration 
workloads of those experienced arbitrators with much domestic or international experience and those 
without.  There do appear to be, however, correlations between respondents’ workloads and other aspects 
of their backgrounds: These dynamics will be examined in much further depth in Thomas J. Stipanowich & 
Zachary P. Ulrich, Arbitration in Evolution: Current Practices and Perspectives of Experienced 
Commercial Arbitrators (article in progress; draft available from the authors). 
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might stimulate settlement (Table E).
120
  The large majority of this group indicated that 
their management of the pre-hearing process, summary disposition of issues, and rulings 
on discovery matters prompt settlement in at least some cases.  Indeed, nearly one-fourth 
of respondents (23.8%) indicated that their summary disposition of issues prompts 
informal settlement in at least half of their cases, and more than a quarter (25.4%) 
responded that their management of pre-hearing processes plays an important role in pre-
hearing settlements in at least half of their cases. 
 
Table E. Promotion of Informal Settlement 
 
Q: As an arbitrator, how often do you do each of the following  
with respect to informal settlement of the cases before you? 
 
  
 
Always Usually 
About half 
the time 
Sometimes Never Total 
Through my management of the 
pre-hearing process, I play an 
important role in helping to settle 
the case prior to hearing. 
0.0
% 
(0) 
20.3% 
(12) 
5.1% 
(3) 
57.6% 
(34) 
17.0% 
(10) 
 
59 
My summary disposition of issues 
prompts informal settlement of 
the entire case. 
0.0
% 
(0) 
6.8% 
(4) 
17.0% 
(10) 
66.1% 
(39) 
10.2% 
(6) 
 
59 
My rulings on discovery matters 
prompt informal settlement of the 
entire case. 
0.0
% 
(0) 
3.4% 
(2) 
3.4% 
(2) 
72.9% 
(43) 
20.3% 
(12) 
 
59 
 
The complete Survey data are replete with more information about how 
experienced arbitrators manage pre-hearing process, oversee discovery, and address 
dispositive motions.
121
  For now, however, we will confine our discussion to a short 
exemplary summary of Survey responses regarding the handling of dispositive motions.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
120
 Paralleling the CCA-Straus Survey results regarding arbitrators’ reported impact on informal settlement 
are the results of a survey conducted in 2009 by our colleague Peter Robinson which asked 368 California 
state trial judges and commissioners questions regarding their efforts to assist settlement and their 
perceived success in doing so.  In that study, much as with the CCA-Straus Survey, it was found that there 
were significant variations in perspectives on the adjudicator’s role in promoting settlement.  Forty-nine 
percent of responding judges and commissioners reported reaching settlement 75% of the time or more (the 
highest-percentage category examined) while another 38% of respondents indicated they reached 
settlement in 50% or less of their conferences.  See Peter Robinson, Settlement Conference Judge – Legal 
Lion or Problem Solving Lamb: An Empirical Documentation of Judicial Settlement Conference Practices 
and Techniques, 33 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 113, 114-18 (2009).  
 
121
 See supra note 119.   
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B.  Managing Motion Practice in Arbitration 
 
Especially in the United States, commercial arbitration has tended to acquire 
many of the trappings of court trial.
122
  This includes, among other things, more extensive 
use of pre-hearing motions by counsel.
123
  In 2009, more than 180 arbitrators, corporate 
counsel and attorneys representing clients in arbitration, attending a Summit on the 
Future of Business-to Business Arbitration, identified “excessive, inappropriate or 
mismanaged motion practice” as a “key source of cost and delay in commercial 
arbitration, as reflected in the electronic spot survey results summarized in Chart F.
124
    
Chart F. Motion Practice in Arbitration  
Q: If you believe arbitration fails to meet the desires of business users 
regarding speed, efficiency and economy, to what extent does excessive, 
inappropriate or mismanaged motion practice tend to contribute to that 
result? 
 
 
The subsequent CCA Protocols for Expeditious, Cost-Effective Commercial 
Arbitration explained that in arbitration, dispositive motions are, “practically speaking, a 
double-edged sword.”125  On the one hand, motion practice often adds to arbitration costs 
and cycle time without clear benefits, as in court.  The filing of a motion can trigger the 
setting of a schedule for briefing and argument requiring major efforts by counsel, all of 
                                                          
122
See CCA PROTOCOLS, supra note 73, at 4-12. 
 
123
 Id. at 8-9.  Cf. Wistrich & Rachlinski, supra note 8, at 626 (discussing need for active judicial 
management of motion practice).   
 
124
 Id. at 8.  
 
125
 COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AT ITS BEST, supra note 48, at 203-06; Zela G. Claiborne, Constructing a 
Fair, Efficient, and Cost-Effective Arbitration, 26 ALTERNATIVES TO THE HIGH COST OF LITIG. 186 (Nov. 
2008).  See also Albert G. Ferris & W. Lee Biddle, The Use of Dispositive Motions in Arbitration, 62 DISP. 
RESOL. J. 17 (Aug.-Oct. 2007). 
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which may come to naught if the arbitrators conclude that the unresolved factual disputes 
require action on the motion to be postponed pending a full hearing on the merits.   
On the other hand, motions may in some cases serve as an excellent means of 
narrowing the issues in dispute and thereby reducing the scope of discovery and hearings.  
Certain matters that do not implicate extensive discovery, presentation of evidence and 
fact-finding may be effectively addressed early in the arbitration process, including 
contractual limitations on damages, statutory remedies, or statutes of limitations and 
other limits on legal causes of action.
126
  Where they may be appropriately granted, such 
motions present arbitrators with opportunities to bring an end to some or all of the 
disputes before them.
127
  The granting of a motion may also motivate a party to initiate 
settlement discussions rather than incur the expense and risk of pursuing a claim that is 
diminished in value and less amenable to pressing through adjudication.  Conversely, 
arbitrators’ reflexive refusal to come to grips with such issues represents a lost 
opportunity to save the parties time and money.   
As noted above, the CCA Protocols call for a measured approach to the handling 
of dispositive motions, admonishing arbitrators to discourage the filing of unproductive 
motions, but to act aggressively in considering those motions that present real 
opportunities for shortening, streamlining or focusing the process.
128
  Other institutional 
standards have embraced similar approaches.
129
 
As reflected in Table G, responses to the CCA-Straus Institute Survey suggest 
that most experienced arbitrators are making efforts to effectively manage motion 
                                                          
126
 See CCA PROTOCOLS, supra note 73, at 9; COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AT ITS BEST, supra note 48, at 
48, 53-55; see generally Adam Raviv, No More Excuses: Toward a Workable System of Dispositive 
Motions in International Arbitration, 28 ARB. INT’L 3 487-510 (2012) (examining the potential for further 
incorporation of dispositive motions into current international arbitration practice; examining commonly 
cited downsides such as delays due to lengthened discovery, meritless motions, and enforceability in local 
courts worldwide; and concluding that not only are all of these potential downsides to summary 
adjudication in international arbitration outweighed by their benefits, but that dispositive motions can and 
should be provided for by the operating rules of international arbitration providers and in arbitration 
agreements).   
 
127
 See Raviv, supra note 126, at 496 (discussing the possibility that meritless motions may unnecessarily 
lengthen international arbitration proceedings, and concluding that “In any event, the possibility of drawn-
out, meritless motions is less a reason to forbid dispositive motions entirely than it is a reason to craft rules 
and provisions that give parties an incentive only to bring dispositive motions that have a significant chance 
of succeeding”); cf. Joe S. Cecil et al., A Quarter-Century of Summary Judgment Practice in Six Federal 
District Courts, 4 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 882−83 (2007) (reporting on 2007 empirical study of six U.S. 
federal district courts’ handling of motions for summary judgment, and showing that, of the cases where 
summary-judgment motions were filed, over half of the time those motions were successful, and over one-
third of the time the cases were actually terminated by the summary-judgment ruling). 
 
128
 CCA Protocols, supra note 73, at 73-74.  See supra text accompanying note 83.   
 
129
 See, e.g., American Arbitration Association, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION RULES AND MEDIATION 
PROCEDURES: INCLUDING PROCEDURES FOR LARGE, COMPLEX COMMERCIAL DISPUTES (RULES AMENDED 
AND EFFECTIVE OCTOBER 1, 2013) 22 (2013),  
https://www.adr.org/aaa/ShowProperty?nodeId=/UCM/ADRSTG_004103&revis ion=latestreleased; 
International Institute for Conflict Prevention & Resolution, GUIDELINES ON EARLY DISPOSITION OF ISSUES 
IN ARBITRATION 1-7 (2011), http://www.cpradr.org/Resources/ALLCPRArticles/tabid/265/ ID/744/CPR- 
Guidelines-on-Early-Disposition-of-Issues-in-Arbitration.aspx. 
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practice and not decline the opportunity to come to grips with opportunities to resolve all 
or part of the case in a summary fashion, early on.  Many arbitrators also appear to be 
taking steps to avoid abuse in the filing of motions by requiring moving parties to show 
there will be a net savings in arbitration time, cost, or both. 
 
Table G. Handling of Dispositive Motions 
 
Q: As an arbitrator, how often do you do the following in handling  
motions for summary disposition? 
 
Alway
s  
Usuall
y  
About 
half the 
time  
Sometime
s  
Never  
Tota
l  
I readily and promptly rule on motions 
for summary disposition of issues.  
43.8% 
(56) 
28.9% 
(37) 
4.7% 
(6) 
18.8% 
(24) 
3.9% 
(5) 
128 
I decline to rule on motions for summary 
disposition of issues, deferring such 
matters until a hearing on the merits of 
the case.  
0.8% 
(1) 
14.1% 
(18) 
2.3% 
(3) 
47.7% 
(61) 
35.2% 
(45) 
128 
I require, before the filing of any motion 
for summary disposition of issues, a 
showing by the moving party that the 
result will be a net savings in arbitration 
time and/or costs.  
18.0% 
(23) 
18.0% 
(23) 
3.9% 
(5) 
21.1% 
(27) 
39.1% 
(50) 
128 
 
     
 
 
 
C. Participation in “Med-Arb”  
There has long been a debate over whether mediators should assume the role of 
arbitrator in the event mediation does not resolve all of the issues in dispute, or whether a 
sitting arbitrator should accept the parties’ invitation to put on a mediator’s hat.130  In the 
United States and many other places, the traditional view has been that although dual-role 
“med-arb” may offer perceived benefits from the standpoint of increased efficiency 
(since a single individual is conducting the entire proceeding) and greater impetus to 
settle (since the mediator carries a “big stick” as the final adjudicator if negotiations fail), 
it is usually inadvisable since the roles of mediator and arbitrator “are very different in 
focus [and] in some respects incompatible.”131  Related concerns include (1) the 
fundamental disjunction between mediation, which normally thrives on ex parte 
communications between the third party intervener and the parties, and arbitration, which 
involves presentation of evidence and argument in the presence of all parties; (2) the fear 
that the “big-stick” wielded by the mediator-arbitrator will undermine party autonomy 
                                                          
130
 See generally COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AT ITS BEST, supra note 48, at 20-27, 28-33 (as a part of the 
final report of the CPR Commission on the Future of Arbitration, offering extensive discussion of issues 
associated with mixed roles and offering detailed guidance on the subject).  Cf. Peter Robinson, Adding 
Judicial Mediation to the Debate about Judges Attempting to Settle Cases Assigned to Them for Trial, 2006 
J. OF DISP. RESOL.335 (2006) (exploring conflicting perspectives and practices of California judges 
regarding their role in settling cases assigned to them for trial).      
 
131
 Id. at 20-21. 
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and self-determination; (3) the concern that parties will be less forthcoming during 
mediation, thereby compromising the ability of the mediator to bring about a settlement; 
(4) the fear that a mediator-turned-arbitrator’s perspective on the issues will have been 
inappropriately influenced by information obtained during mediation; (5) in the absence 
of a clear waiver, the concern that a subsequent arbitration award may be subject to a 
motion to vacate on the basis of ex parte contact;
132
 and (6) questions about the 
qualifications of the third-party intervener to play both roles.
133
  Despite all of these 
concerns, however, there is evidence that many mediators and arbitrators in the United 
States have engaged in med-arb, at least occasionally,
134
 and that proponents of these 
“hybrid” processes see them as a valuable consensual alternative to more traditional 
approaches if appropriately utilized.
135
  For this reason, the CCA-Straus Institute Survey 
included a series of questions regarding med-arb.  
Of the 59 respondents to the Survey who indicated some level of concern with 
respect to informal settlement of disputes (representing 46.1% of all respondents), nearly 
half (27 individuals, or 45.8%) indicated that they had served as both a mediator and an 
arbitrator with respect to the same dispute.
136
  The specific kinds of scenarios in which 
this experience occurred are reflected in Table H.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
132
 Id. at 21-22.  See also Blankley, supra note 102; Richard Fullerton, Med-Arb and Its Variants: Ethical 
Issues for Parties and Neutrals, 65-OCT DISP. RES. J. 52 (May-Oct. 2010).    
 
133
 Id. at 23.      
 
134
 See Gerald F. Phillips, Back to Med-Arb: Survey Indicates Process Concerns are Decreasing, 26 
ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COST LITIG. 73 (April 2008) (discussing results of survey of arbitrators); 
Stipanowich, supra note 64, at 853-54 (discussing informal poll of mediators regarding incidence of med-
arb in their practice).  
 
135
 See, e.g., Louise A. LaMothe, Med-Arb: Yes or No?, 5 N.Y. DISP. RESOL. L. 43 (Spring 2012); Edna 
Sussman, Developing an Effective Med-Arb/Arb-Med Process, 2 N.Y. DISP. RESOL. L. 71 (Spring 2009); 
Gerald F. Phillips, Same-Neutral Med-Arb: What Does the Future Hold? 60-JUL DISP. RESOL. J. 24 (May-
July 2005); Yolanda Vorys, The Best of Both Worlds: The Use of Med-Arb for Resolving Will Disputes, 
22 Ohio St. J. on Disp. Resol. 871 (2007).      
 
136
 Because only individuals who expressed a concern with informal settlement were queried regarding 
participation in med-arb, we are unable to ascertain the level of experience with med-arb within the overall 
Survey group.   
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Table H. Experience with Med-Arb  
(Question to CCA Members who claimed to have experience with med-arb) 
 
Q: Have you served as both an arbitrator and a mediator with respect to the 
same dispute, where . . . 
  
 
Yes No Total 
During mediation, the parties asked you to switch to the 
role of arbitrator? 
66.7% 
(18) 
33.3% 
(9) 
 
       27 
 
During arbitration, the parties asked you to switch to the 
role of mediator? 
92.6% 
(25) 
7.4% 
(26) 
       27  
The parties agreed at the outset that you would mediate 
the dispute and, failing a resolution through mediation, 
switch to the role of arbitrator. 
66.7% 
(18) 
33.3% 
(9) 
 
       27 
 
 
Shortly after the completion of the CCA-Straus Institute Survey, a parallel 
canvass of experienced mediators was undertaken by the authors  at the invitation of the 
International Academy of Mediators, an organization of experienced mediators from the 
U.S., the E.U. and some other parts of the world.
137
  This survey provided another 
opportunity to explore the extent of experience in med-arb (Table I).   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
137
 The IAM-Straus Institute Survey on Mediator Practices and Perceptions was sent to 153 individuals, all 
IAM Fellows, and 85.0% (130 individuals) participated in the survey; 78.4% (120 individuals) completed 
the entire survey.  The respondent pool included individuals who stated they “regularly practiced” in 
Africa; Asia, including the Middle East; Australia and New Zealand; Canada; Europe (both Western and 
Eastern, with a majority from the UK); Latin America; and the United States.   
About ninety percent (89.8%) of respondents indicated that they worked “full-time” at the time the 
Survey was administered, and devoted, on average, more than seventy percent of their work time to 
mediation practice.  Nearly half (47.7%) of respondents indicated that they devote more than ninety percent 
of their work time to practice as a mediator.  Survey participants had, on average, over eighteen years of 
mediation experience, and had conducted, on average, almost 1,500 mediation cases throughout their 
careers.  (It should be noted that Survey participants were asked to select ranges of the estimated 
percentage of their work time dedicated to mediation practice, the length of time since they first began 
mediating, and the number of cases they estimated themselves to have previously mediated.  The 
respondent-pool averages were then calculated by multiplying the proportion of respondents selecting each 
range by the lowest value in each range (e.g., for a range of “500-999” cases, it was assumed that all 
respondents selecting that range chose “500”).  Thus, the calculated averages stated here almost surely 
underestimate the actual experience level of the respondent pool.) 
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Table I. Experience with Med-Arb (IAM Members) 
 
Q: How many times would you estimate you have served as both  
a mediator and arbitrator, with respect to the same dispute, where . . . 
 
  
 
0 times / 
none 
1-5  
Times 
6-10  
times 
11-25 
times 
26-50 
times 
51+ 
times 
Total 
During mediation, the parties 
asked you to switch to the 
role of arbitrator? 
61.3% 
(76) 
20.2% 
(25) 
9.7% 
(12) 
2.4% 
(3) 
4.8% 
(6) 
1.6%   
(2) 
 
  124 
During arbitration, the parties 
asked you to switch to the 
role of mediator? 
64.5% 
(80) 
20.1% 
(26) 
7.3% 
(9) 
4.8% 
(6) 
0.0% 
(0) 
2.4%  
(3) 
 
  124 
The parties agreed at the 
outset that you would mediate 
the dispute and, failing a 
resolution through mediation, 
switch to the role of 
arbitrator. 
52.4% 
(65) 
33.9% 
(42) 
5.7% 
(7) 
3.2% 
(4) 
3.2% 
(4) 
1.6%  
(2) 
 
  124 
 
As reflected in Table I, at least a third of responding experienced mediators had 
had the experience of switching roles at the behest of the parties during the course of a 
mediation or arbitration; nearly half claimed to have experience with med-arb where the 
parties agreed ahead of time to conduct mediation, and if mediation failed the mediator 
would switch to the role of arbitrator.  A total of 76 of the 124 respondents to the 
questions (61.3%) reflected some experience as a dual-role neutral.      
Thus, despite evidence that multiple concerns regarding dual-role intervention 
dissuade many from engaging in such activity, many arbitrators and mediators apparently 
do so at least occasionally.  Indeed, a majority of surveyed mediators have had at least 
some experience with med-arb. Given these results, perhaps it is time to closely examine 
the collective experiences of mediators, arbitrators and advocates with med-arb, to 
ascertain whether and to what extent it can produce satisfactory experiences, and what 
guidance (cautionary or otherwise) might be offered to those contemplating its use.
138
          
 
V.     CONCLUSION: SOME STRAIGHTFORWARD PROPOSALS 
 
We are in the midst of a continuous, expanding international dialogue that is 
gradually spurring a re-assessment of the roles played by arbitrators and other 
stakeholders in arbitration and dispute resolution processes.  This evolution is 
increasingly informed by a new wave of empirical studies including those that record and 
examine perceptions and experiences, like the CCA-Straus Institute Survey, as well as 
                                                          
138
 One possibility, proposed in Part V, would be a refinement of protocols for those contemplating the use 
of med-arb in various settings.  See infra text accompanying note 147.   
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others that are bringing to the surface cognitive biases and filters.
139
  More and more, it 
behooves arbitrators, as well as counselors and advocates, to approach their roles 
thoughtfully and reflectively rather than reflexively.      
Our brief consideration of settlement in arbitration suggests that the time is ripe 
for informed discussion and deliberation respecting opportunities for settlement and the 
appropriate roles of arbitrators with regard to the settlement of disputes.  As commercial 
arbitration has taken on more of the trappings of litigation such as extended pretrial 
proceedings with accompanying motion practice and discovery, Survey data indicate that 
the incidence of pre-award settlement has also increased.
140
  Recent initiatives focused on 
promoting economy and efficiency in arbitration also create enhanced opportunities for 
settlement before and during arbitration.
141
  The Survey data indicate that many 
arbitrators are making efforts to more actively manage cases, including more effectively 
handling dispositive motions
142
; the result will surely be not only reduced process cost 
and cycle time, but also greater number of cases resolved earlier in the arbitration 
process.  It appears, too, that despite frequently pronounced concerns regarding the 
pitfalls of acting as both mediator and arbitrator in the same dispute, many mediators and 
arbitrators occasionally accept dual roles.
143
   
Many arbitrators, arbitration practitioners and scholars are now recognizing that 
the traditional paradigm of the arbitrator as single-minded adjudicator must be refined to 
incorporate a broader concept of the arbitral role, including active case management at all 
stages of the proceeding, early resolution of some or all issues, and activities that set the 
stage for settlement.
144
  The Survey data, however, suggest that such attitudes are far 
from pervasive, and that some arbitrators adhere to a mindset focused solely on resolution 
through adjudication.  
  
Guidelines for Settlement in Commercial Arbitration 
A logical next step would be to lay the groundwork for a broader appreciation of 
the opportunities that exist for achieving early resolution of arbitrated cases through 
settlement.  Recognizing that, as in dealing with the problem of excessive costs and 
inefficiencies in arbitration, the solution must be a shared one involving all of the key 
stakeholders in arbitration, the proposed effort would involve the development of an 
authoritative set of guidelines giving clear direction to arbitrators as well as business 
                                                          
139
 See, e.g., Wistrich & Rachlinski, supra note 8; Shai Danziger, Jonathan Levav & Liora Avnaim-Pesso, 
Extraneous Factors in Judicial Decisions, 108 PNAS 6889(2011); Terry A. Maroney & James J. Gross, 
The Ideal of the Dispassionate Judge: An Emotion Regulation Perspective, 6 Emotion Rev. 142(2014); Neil 
Vidmar, The Psychology of Trial Judging, 20 CURRENT DIRECTIONS IN PSYCHOL. SCI. 58 (2011). 
 
140
 See supra Part III.A. 
 
141
 See supra Part II.B. 
 
142
 See supra Parts IV.A., B. 
 
143
 See supra Part IV.C. 
 
144
 See supra Part III.B. 
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users and corporate counsel, advocates and arbitration provider institutions on these 
subjects along the lines of the CCA Protocols.  Like the Protocols, these guidelines might 
have an impact on practice as well as the formulation of future commercial arbitration 
procedures.  
Neither the CCA Protocols nor the ICC Techniques focus specifically on 
settlement, while the CEDR Commission Report and resulting Rules fail to touch upon a 
number of options for setting the stage for settlement.  A set of Guidelines (or Protocols) 
for Settlement in Commercial Arbitration, put together under the leadership of one or 
more prominent organizations with the involvement of arbitrators, provider institutions, 
corporate counsel and arbitration practitioners, could create a platform for mutual 
appreciation and understanding of the ways in which early settlement may be most 
effectively encouraged in arbitration.  This would offer specific recommendations on 
methods for setting the stage for settlement through exchange/discovery of key 
information, effective handling of dispositive motions, and the like.  It would also 
provide specific examples of interplay between mediation and arbitration, including 
“Guided Choice” options.145   
In the course of developing such Protocols, there would also be an opportunity to 
further examine the pros and cons of the approaches at the heart of the CEDR Rules, 
including providing parties with preliminary views or findings of fact or facilitating 
settlement conferences.
146
  The discussion should also embrace med-arb, particularly 
since so many arbitrators and mediators engage in such activities at least occasionally.
147
  
Even if there is not a consensus favoring the use of these approaches, some form of 
guidance (including appropriate cautionary notes) might be developed for those wishing 
to utilize them.
148
      
                                                          
145
 As a part of his Guided Choice platform, for example, attorney-mediator Paul Lurie, has proposed 
language to create a mechanism for mediators to seek decisions from judges or arbitrators to help settle 
cases.  The proposed language (revised by  Professor Stipanowich to focus solely on arbitrated cases) is as 
follows: 
The parties participating in mediation may agree that a binding or non-binding opinion 
from an arbitrator pursuant to an agreement to arbitrate would be useful in helping to 
settle the dispute.  The suggested protocol for such a procedure would be: 
 The mediator may assist the parties to define the issue to be submitted to the 
arbitrator for an opinion.   
 The submitted issues may include, but not be limited to, matters of jurisdiction, 
discovery, motions to dismiss, pre-trial orders, evidentiary matters and summary 
judgment. 
 An informal opinion will only be given to the mediator, who will communicate its 
substance in a manner which the mediator determines to be the most likely to help 
settle the case. 
 This informal opinion will not be part of any record used in a subsequent proceeding 
if the case does not settle. 
E-mail from Paul M. Lurie to Thomas Stipanowich, May 2, 2014 (on file with Prof. Stipanowich). 
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 See supra text accompanying note 98.  
 
147
 See supra Part IV.C.   
 
148
 Earlier templates for such guidance are contained in the Report of the CPR Commission on the Future of 
Arbitration.  See COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AT ITS BEST, supra note 48, at  22-24 (“Guidelines for 
situations where parties desire a mediator to assume the role of arbitrator” ), 29-32 (“The arbitrator as 
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Ethical Guidelines 
Consideration might also be given to related ethical guidelines for dispute 
resolution professionals.  This could take the form of proposals to revise the Code of 
Ethics for Arbitrators in Commercial Disputes
149
 and the IBA Rules of Ethics for 
International Arbitrators
150
 to incorporate more specific treatment of the role of 
arbitrators in settlement.  Alternatively, an annotation or commentary on the application 
of the current standards to settlement-related scenarios could be developed.      
Of course, legal counselors and advocates must play a leading role in creating 
appropriate opportunities for settlement during the course of dispute resolution.  To this 
day, however, no set of specific ethical guidelines exists for attorneys who draft dispute 
resolution agreements and represent clients in mediation and arbitration.  Today, as 
growing attention is being given to the ethical responsibilities of legal counselors and 
advocates in international arbitration,
151
 it would be appropriate to develop ethical 
guidelines for U.S. practitioners that reflect current U.S. practice but that take note of or, 
to the extent possible, are harmonized with developing international norms.  Such a 
project might begin as an annotated version of the Model Rules of Professional 
Conduct
152
 for legal counselors and advocates in commercial arbitration, to be used as a 
basis for education and training.
153
   
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                             
mediator in the same matter” and Draft Protocol for Arbitrators Who Participate in Settlement 
Discussions”).  See also CEDR COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 4, at   13-15 (“Safeguards for arbitrators 
who use private meetings with each party as a means of facilitating settlement”).  Another interesting 
possibility would be the creation of a Commission on Mixed Roles in Dispute Resolution (see draft concept 
paper on file with Professor Stipanowich). 
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 See supra note 6. 
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 See supra note 5. 
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 See Catherine A. Rogers, Fit and Function in Legal Ethics: Developing a Code of Conduct for 
International Arbitration, 23 MICH. J. INT’L. 341 (2002); Catherine A. Rogers, The Ethics of Advocacy in 
International Arbitration (Bocconi Legal Studies Research Paper No. 18-2010, 2010), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1559012.  
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 A beginning of this effort may be found in Thomas J. Stipanowich, Effective Advocacy in Arbitration: 
What Arbitrators Wish Lawyers Knew (draft on file with Prof. Stipanowich).   
